Case Results

FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify – Supreme Court Further Defines “Issue of Public Interest”

FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify
Time to discuss the very important opinion by the California Supreme Court in the case of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify. To fully understand this opinion and the reasoning behind it, it is necessary to read the entire opinion, because it beautifully builds from the roots of the anti-SLAPP statute all the way to the ultimate conclusion. But in case you don’t have that kind of time, I’ll summarize it up front, and then offer a guided tour through the opinion.

The Facts and Legal Holdings of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify.

FilmOn.com Inc. (FilmOn) is a for-profit business entity that distributes web-based entertainment programming. In this case, FilmOn sued DoubleVerify Inc. (DoubleVerify), another for-profit business entity that offers online tracking, verification and “brand safety” services to Internet advertisers. In other words, DoubleVerify offers its conclusions about sites and content, so advertisers can be sure their ads do not end up in places they might consider to be inappropriate. FilmOn did not like what DoubleVerify had reported to its clients, and sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s unfair competition law.

DoubleVerify responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which was granted by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Judge Terry Green presiding. The Court of Appeal agreed with Judge Green’s conclusion that DoubleVerify’s reports “concerned issues of interest to the public” because “the public has a demonstrable interest in knowing what content is available on the Internet, especially with respect to adult content and the illegal distribution of copyrighted materials.” To support its conclusion, the court analogized DoubleVerify’s confidential reports to ratings by the Motion Picture Association of America, writing, “the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) engages in conduct quite similar to DoubleVerify’s activities by rating movies concerning their level of adult content, and the MPAA does so, because the public cares about the issue.”

It is always a hail Mary to appeal to the California Supreme Court, but surprisingly the Court elected to take up this matter, “to decide whether the commercial nature of a defendant’s speech is relevant in determining whether that speech merits protection under the catchall provision. To resolve this question, we also clarify how the context of a statement more broadly – including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech – informs the same analysis.”

In a unanimous decision, the Supremes reversed the Court of Appeal, and sent the case back to Judge Green for an order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. In essence, as I have repeated here a hundred times, the Court found that context is everything. It found that determining whether the ratings issued by DoubleVerify are a matter of public interest is not viewed in a vacuum. Rather, even if it is concluded that the speech is a matter of public interest, that speech must be in furtherance of the speech on the topic.

It is by carefully observing this wedding of content and context that we can discern if conduct is “in furtherance of” free speech “in connection with” a public issue or issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) What this union of content and context lets us discern in this case is that DoubleVerify’s report does not qualify for protection under the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.

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A Huge Anti-SLAPP Victory by Morris & Stone in the Court of Appeal

Noe v J Niley Dorit

J. Niley Dorit v. Noe

At Morris & Stone, we sometimes take a case with an eye toward the greater legal implications. Prevailing for the client is of course our number one goal, but occasionally it is clear that the case could have legal implications beyond the dispute between the parties. This was such a case. It began as a, “well, that can’t be right” case, and morphed into a precedent that will control a small part of anti-SLAPP law until the universe reaches heat death.

Yet, it all started out so simply . . .

In January 2018, our client (we’ll call him Jack because that’s his name) hired an attorney named J. Niley Dorit to evaluate the medical records of Jack’s deceased mother for a potential medical malpractice suit against her doctors. The parties signed a fee agreement in which Jack agreed to pay Dorit a $10,000 non-refundable retainer fee. This sum was intended to cover Dorit’s time spent evaluating the claim, as well as “the costs of additional medical records and/or expert medical review if indicated.” The agreement contained an arbitration clause, which stated, “Should there arise any disagreement as to the amount of attorneys fees and/or costs, Client agrees to enter into binding arbitration of such issue or dispute before the Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF).”

On March 19, 2018, Dorit called Jack on the phone to present his analysis of the records. According to Dorit, Jack cut him off soon after Dorit began his presentation. Jack asked Dorit simply to provide his ultimate conclusion about the potential malpractice claim. Dorit said he did not think a malpractice claim was viable.

Jack was frustrated, feeling that Dorit had not provided $10,000 worth of services, especially given that he apparently had not consulted any medical experts. Conversely, Dorit felt that his experience with medical malpractice cases qualified him to review the file sufficiently to determine if a malpractice case was warranted. The medical file was huge, so Dorit felt he had earned his fee in examining the file.

The Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act

This is the sort of situation envisioned when the MFAA was was created. MFAA stands for Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act. Under California law, a client can challenge the fees charged by their attorney using this State Bar regulated process. It is designed to be very informal, and the arbitrator is not even required to follow the rules of evidence. It is a quick, low-cost way to have a fee dispute decided. Often the attorney fees involved in a fee dispute are relatively nominal, and it would never make economic sense to have to sue in court, let alone hire yet another attorney to do so. Rather than to force clients to stew in their own juices over the anger of having no recourse, the MFAA provides a quick review of the fees paid. And contrary to popular belief that the process is rigged in favor of attorneys, the MFAA arbitrators are very strict in determining if the attorney has observed all legal requirements.

Thus, a perfect process existed for Jack and Dorit to have the dispute decided, without going to court or even squaring off at ten paces. They submitted the fee dispute to MFAA arbitration. They presented their evidence to the Arbitrator, and ultimately he found in favor of Dorit, and allowed him to keep the $10,000 fee, awarding Jack nothing. Jack even had to cover the filing fee.

There are a couple of important things to know about the MFAA process. By law, a client always has the option to submit any fee dispute to arbitration. Sometimes it is the attorney who wants to sue to recover unpaid fees, but the attorney cannot take the matter to court without first giving the client the option to submit the dispute to arbitration. At that point, the arbitration is non-binding, unless the client then agrees to make it binding. If it is non-binding, then either party is free to reject the award of the Arbitrator and proceed to court.

Additionally, since the arbitration is so informal, and does not follow the rules of evidence, nothing from the arbitration can be used in any subsequent court proceeding. For example, had this matter proceeded to trial, Dorit would not have been permitted to bring up the fact that he had won the arbitration, or to bring up any of the arbitration testimony. It’s simply as though it never happened. This is because it would be entirely unfair to have a situation where clients are encouraged to go to an informal arbitration without the benefit of legal counsel, but then use the results of that hearing against the client in some other more formal forum, such as a trial.

OK; you now know everything you need to know about MFAA arbitrations. Back to our tale.

When we left our heroes, Dorit had won, and Jack was very unhappy with the result. But Jack has a code, and that code dictated that he had lost fair and square, and he would live with that result. Even though he would have been free to reject the conclusions of the Arbitrator, he did nothing and allowed the award to become final.

Dorit sues for Malicious Prosecution

But Dorit was not as accommodating. Dorit was upset that Jack had dared to question his entitlement to the $10,000 in fees, which he felt had been a malicious thing to do, so he sued Jack in San Francisco Superior Court for Malicious Prosecution. Read the rest of this entry »

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Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the action?

anti-SLAPP appeal stay

Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the entire action?

Seemingly, this question has been clearly answered ever since the Supreme Court ruling in Varian Medical Systems v. Delfino, way back in 2005, but I still see a lot of confusion on the topic.

As an example, I recently prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion against an attorney, who was representing herself in a defamation action against my client. After the victory, as is my practice, I asked her if she wanted to pay the current attorney fees in order to avoid the extra expense of the motion for attorney fees.**

She chortled, “You can’t bring a motion for attorney fees, because I filed a notice of appeal regarding the ruling on the motion.”

After I prevailed on my motion for attorney fees, as is my practice, I called counsel to ask if she wanted to pay the (now greater) fees in order to avoid the extra fees for my time spent on collection, and the embarrassment of having her wages garnished at her law firm. (Yes, unlike typical collection efforts, the time spent on collecting attorney fees following an anti-SLAPP motion is recoverable.)

She chortled (what can I say? She’s a chortling fool), “You can’t seek to recover those attorney fees while an appeal is pending.”

We are currently receiving 25% of each of her paychecks while we await a date for oral argument on the appeal.

Allow me to take you through the Varian Medical Systems decision, because it lays out a good summary of the historical background on this point. These are the facts as summarized by the Supreme Court. Read the rest of this entry »

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Shia LaBeouf – An Anti-SLAPP Legend in His Own Mind

Shia LeBouf anti-SLAPP legend

Shia LaBeouf, the actor of Even Stevens and Transformers fame, walked into one of my favorite eateries, and was denied service by the bartender, who felt that LaBeouf had already had enough. As Hollywood teaches, everything is based on racism, so LaBeouf immediately assumed that the refusal had to be based on racism, and called the bartender a “fucking racist” and “fucking racist bitch” (hereinafter, ‘FRB”). In classic, “do you know who I am?” fashion, LaBeouf pounded his fist on the bar counter, and yelled “you’re not going to fucking serve me?”, before going around behind the bar to confront the bartender, who felt sufficiently threatened to arm himself with a bottle of Grey Goose vodka.1 LaBeouf was escorted from the bar.

The bartender took umbrage with being called an FRB in a restaurant full of people, so he sued LaBeouf for defamation. After foolishly failing to consult with me, LaBeouf responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, and here’s where things get fun. Why would anyone on God’s green earth think that this defamation action would be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion? What is the public interest that would bring it under the statute?

But before accusing LaBeouf and his attorneys of being foolish for thinking that the an anti-SLAPP motion would apply to these facts, allow me to throw them a small bone by providing a little legal context. Read the rest of this entry »

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SLAPP027 – When a Motion to Dismiss is a Better Strategy than an Anti-SLAPP Motion

President Trump is never short on controversy, and said controversy leads to some interesting cases. In Episode 27 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we will discuss two Trump cases — one First Amendment and one anti-SLAPP — arising from the words and tweets of our sneerless leader. We’ll also discuss when a motion to dismiss can be a better option than an anti-SLAPP motion.

The first case is Nwanguma v. Donald Trump, arising from his comments at a political rally before he was elected. When hecklers tried to shout him down, he said “get ’em out of here.” The crowd heeded his words and bodily removed the protesters, who then sued for battery and incitement. They claimed that by saying “get ’em out of here,” Trump incited the crowd to riot. Trump moved to dismiss, arguing that his words were mere hyperbole. How did the court rule? Listen to Episode 27 and find out!

Next comes the infamous case of Stormy Daniels v. Donald Trump. Daniels sued Trump in two different forums for two different claims. In one, she is simply trying to get out the contract whereby she was paid for her silence. In the other, she had stated during a press conference that she had been threatened by a man who told her to be quiet about sleeping with Trump, even showing an artist’s rendering of the allege suspect from many years prior. Trump felt compelled to tweet that the story was a total “con job.”

Her attorney, Michael Avenati, who would have known better if he listened to the California SLAPP Law Podcast, decided to sue for defamation for Trump’s usage of the phrase “con job.” As any regular listener would know, “con job” is just too imprecise to support a defamation claim. It is not verifiably false, and without a verifiably false statement, there can be no defamation. Trump brought an anti-SLAPP motion, which was granted.

Not a good week for Avenati. In the same week that the court granted Trump’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding that Daniels would therefore be liable for all of Trump’s attorney fees, Avenati was found personally liable for a multi million dollar judgment by a former associate at his firm, and was given an eviction notice from his law offices for failure to pay rent.

And stay around for the after show, where I discuss the happenings with Bell v. Feibush, some precedent I created six years ago.

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Daniels’ Defamation Action Against Trump was Doomed from the Start

I have frequently warned about the path defamation claims can take, and it was illustrated once more by the kerfuffle between Donald Trump and Stormy Daniels.

Here is the pattern.

Way outside every controlling statute of limitations, a woman states she was assaulted by a man, and the man responds by going on social media or stating to the press that the assault never occurred. The woman then sues for defamation, claiming that by denying the assault, the man is calling her a liar. As a variation, the accused man sometimes comes right out and says she is lying.

It’s a tough situation for the accused. If he fails to deny the charge, then it will be assumed that it must be true, but if he does deny it, then he buys himself a defamation action. He was safe from legal action, but his words started a whole new statute of limitations on the defamation claim. This is precisely what happen when Bill Cosby denied raping various women, which lead to very different conclusions.

Defamation claims against Bill Cosby.

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SLAPP026 – Don’t Sue for Defamation Unless the Statements Really are False

Canada, eh? Those hosers in Ontario didn’t get around to passing an anti-SLAPP statute until 2015, and they’re still trying to figure it out.

In this episode of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we travel to the great white north to examine an anti-SLAPP motion that was denied by the trial court, but granted by the appellate court. It beautifully illustrates the most fundamental point of a defamation case that oh so many attorneys still don’t understand. A statement is not defamatory unless it is false, no matter what the quantum of harm it may cause.

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The Morris Plan – How to Force Yelp (and other sites) to Remove Defamatory Reviews

Removing defamatory reviews.

What you are about to read is a completely untested but viable approach to forcing Yelp to remove a false and defamatory review, based on recent legal developments. It is on the bleeding edge of the law, and as that name implies, it may not be without pain as it works its ways through the courts. No nasty emails if it doesn’t work for you.

This approach arises from Yelp’s irrational need to create bad precedent, as evidenced by the Yelp v. McMillan case, and most recently the Supreme Court matter of Hassell v. Bird, wherein Yelp argued that the content posted by third parties is its content.

To those unfamiliar, in Hassell v. Bird the defendant Bird defamed a law firm – the Hassell Law Group – in a Yelp review. Hassell sued Bird, and the court found that the Yelp “review” by Bird was false and defamatory, and ordered Bird to take it down. But then comes a twist unique to this case. Knowing that Bird would be unlikely to comply with the order, the court also ordered Yelp to remove the review, even though Yelp had never been a party to the action.

It is not uncommon for court orders to include persons or entities who were not parties to the action, if some action by those third parties is necessary to effectuate the order. In a typical renter eviction action, for example, only the known tenant will be named in the action, but the eviction order will apply to anyone occupying the residence, in case the tenant allowed others to move in, subleased the property, etc. Read the rest of this entry »

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Mandated Arbitration Does Not Create a “Protected Activity”


A decision that involves both beer and anti-SLAPP law is right up my alley, so I had to bring you the details of Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company, LLC out of the Second District.

The importance of this case is the lesson it teaches in focusing on whether the conduct in question is indeed “protected activity” such that it satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. As I have stated here before, the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute has grown and grown, but attorneys must not give short shrift to the first prong.

I. Facts Read the rest of this entry »

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SLAPP023 – Privileged Speech Can Survive Anti-SLAPP Motions

In Episode 23 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we examine two cases that consider how privileged speech should be viewed during the two-prong anti-SLAPP analysis. As you will hear, the fact that the speech was privileged does not mean it automatically falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Edalati v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

This unpublished case is our starting point. In Edalati, a dentist learned that Kaiser Foundation Health Plan had sent a letter to dozens of her patients, falsely informing them that the dentist was on a government list for Medicare abuse. Kaiser realized it’s mistake and sent out a retraction letter, but by that point the damage had been done. The dentist sued for defamation, and Kaiser responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.

Kaiser’s letter clearly falls under the common interest privilege of Civil Code section 47, but is that enough to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion?

Lefebvre v. Lefebvre

In opposition to Kaiser’s anti-SLAPP motion, the dentist in Edalati relied on the case of Lefebvre v. Lefebvre. In that case, a wife, in the hope that it would help in a custody dispute, filed a false police report against her husband, claiming he had threatened to kill her and their children. He was arrested and charged. He was found not guilty, and then sued his ex-wife for defamation. The wife brought an anti-SLAPP motion.

The report to the police enjoys an absolute privilege, so the anti-SLAPP motion must have been granted, right? Don’t be so sure. Listen to this latest episode to find out. Here’s a hint. The case law discussed in this episode offers a means to save attorneys and their clients from an award of attorney fees when they end up on the wrong side of an anti-SLAPP motion.

A great, FREE program

The publisher stopped supporting and offering a fantastic program called Notescraps that I use every day in my practice. I not only prevailed on them to keep offering the program, I got them to give it to you for free (it used to be $20). I tell you how to get it on this episode.

Book ’em Danno.

And finally, just for fun, I tell the tale of my encounter with some officious deputies at the courthouse. I still made it to court and still won my motion.

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Aaron Morris, Attorney
Aaron Morris
Morris & Stone, LLP

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NOTICE PURSUANT TO BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6158.3: The outcome of any case will depend on the facts specific to that case. Nothing contained in any portion of this web site should be taken as a representation of how your particular case would be concluded, or even that a case with similar facts will have a similar result. The result of any case discussed herein was dependent on the facts of that case, and the results will differ if based on different facts.

This site seeks to present legal issues in a hopefully entertaining manner. Hyperbolic language should not be taken literally. For example, if I refer to myself as the “Sultan of SLAPP” or the “Pharaoh of Free Speech,” it should not be assumed that I am actually a Sultan or a Pharaoh.

Factual summaries are entirely accurate in the sense of establishing the legal scenario, but are changed as necessary to protect the privacy of the clients.