Author Archive
SLAPP026 – Don’t Sue for Defamation Unless the Statements Really are False
Canada, eh? Those hosers in Ontario didn’t get around to passing an anti-SLAPP statute until 2015, and they’re still trying to figure it out.
In this episode of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we travel to the great white north to examine an anti-SLAPP motion that was denied by the trial court, but granted by the appellate court. It beautifully illustrates the most fundamental point of a defamation case that oh so many attorneys still don’t understand. A statement is not defamatory unless it is false, no matter what the quantum of harm it may cause.
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SLAPP025 – Anti-SLAPP Motion Defeats Gone With the Wind Actress
de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC
If you sell t-shirts bearing the images of the Three Stooges, can you be sued for violating their right of publicity?
And if you create and broadcast an 8-part docudrama centering on Bette Davis and Joan Crawford, can Olivia de Havilland sue you for including the details of HER life in that story?
Well, the just decided case of de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC answers both those questions.
I enjoyed this anti-SLAPP case because it beautifully illustrates how some judges just don’t understand precedent.
Olivia de Havilland, who is now 102 years old, did not like the way she was protrayed in the FX docudrama, “Feud: Bette and Joan,” centering on deceased actresses Bette Davis and Joan Crawford.
In case you don’t recognize the name, de Havilland portrayed Melanie in Gone With the Wind. She was the one Scarlett was always jealous of, as I recall.
She sued FX, claiming the portrayal of her in the show amounted to the unauthorized use of her name and likeness for commercial gain.
FX responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.
The trial court, Judge Holly Kendig presiding, denied the anti-SLAPP motion, relying in large part on a California Supreme Court decision called Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.
FX appealed. Listen to Episode 25 to see how it all turned out.
What is the current status of the requirement that an anti-SLAPP motion be heard within 30 days of filing?
Previously, Fair Political Practices Commission v. American Civil Right Coalition, Inc. and Decker v. U.D. Registry had held that the 30-day requirement was jurisdictional. Now Karnazes v. Ares holds that it is the clerk’s burden to set the hearing within 30 days. But does that mean counsel is safe if a hearing is outside the 30-day deadline. Listen to find out.
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Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Podcast, Podcasts | Tags: Judge Ariadne Symons, Olivia de Havilland | No Comments »
The Morris Plan – How to Force Yelp (and other sites) to Remove Defamatory Reviews
Removing defamatory reviews.
What you are about to read is a completely untested but viable approach to forcing Yelp to remove a false and defamatory review, based on recent legal developments. It is on the bleeding edge of the law, and as that name implies, it may not be without pain as it works its ways through the courts. No nasty emails if it doesn’t work for you.
This approach arises from Yelp’s irrational need to create bad precedent, as evidenced by the Yelp v. McMillan case, and most recently the Supreme Court matter of Hassell v. Bird, wherein Yelp argued that the content posted by third parties is its content.
To those unfamiliar, in Hassell v. Bird the defendant Bird defamed a law firm – the Hassell Law Group – in a Yelp review. Hassell sued Bird, and the court found that the Yelp “review” by Bird was false and defamatory, and ordered Bird to take it down. But then comes a twist unique to this case. Knowing that Bird would be unlikely to comply with the order, the court also ordered Yelp to remove the review, even though Yelp had never been a party to the action.
It is not uncommon for court orders to include persons or entities who were not parties to the action, if some action by those third parties is necessary to effectuate the order. In a typical renter eviction action, for example, only the known tenant will be named in the action, but the eviction order will apply to anyone occupying the residence, in case the tenant allowed others to move in, subleased the property, etc. Read the rest of this entry »
SLAPP024 – Supreme Court Clarifies Whether Amended Complaint Resets 60-Day Clock for Anti-SLAPP Motion
In Episode 24 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we tackle two important anti-SLAPP issues.
Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism
The conventional wisdom until now, as expressed in cases such as Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, was that an amended complaint creates an new 60-day period to file an anti-SLAPP motion. Then along came the Court of Appeal decision of Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism. In that case, the plaintiff originally sued on two causes of action, to which the defendant demurrered. When the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, which added two new causes of action, the defendant finally filed an anti-SLAPP motion, challenging all the claims, including the two that had been there all along. The trial court refused to consider the challenge to the previously existing claims, stating they were past the 60 days since they could have been previously challenged. The Supreme Court agreed.
This is a quantum shift in the prior case law, but will the consequences be as severe as the holding seems to indicate? Listen to Episode 24 to find out, and for the best strategies for dealing with the Newport Harbor reasoning.
Dowling v. Zimmerman
Certainly not a new case, but we use it to discuss whether an appeal stays collection of costs and attorney fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion.
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You CAN Join an Anti-SLAPP Motion Brought by Another Party
I remember sitting in court – Judge Banks’ court in Orange County to be specific – and he called a motion for summary judgment that was on calendar, noting that another party had “joined” the motion. I see this all the time. One party files a demurrer, or a motion for summary judgment, or whatever, and an attorney representing a different party says, “hey, that’s a great idea,” and files a “notice of joinder” on the motion. You may have engaged in the behavior yourself.
But as Judge Banks explained to the unfortunate attorney, it doesn’t work that way. As he put it, “when you ‘join’ in a motion, it means only that you are cheering from the sideline, ‘go team go.’” The court has no power to bestow the requested relief on your client.
The reason should be self-evident. The evidence that is offered in support of a motion for summary judgment for one client may have no applicability to another. The missing elements that would justify sustaining a demurrer as to one party may not apply to another. If “joinder” were permitted, then the non-movant would be placed in a terrible quandary. He, she, or it would have to speculate on why the same arguments would apply to the joining party, and try to oppose them.
But with all that said, an anti-SLAPP motion presents a different analysis. Because of the two prong analysis, a defendant can ride on the coattails of another moving defendant. If the movant successfully argues that the conduct falls under the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of success. The second prong can then be decided without any evidence from the defendant who joined the motion.
In the case of a motion for summary judgment, for example, the moving defendant must present evidence sufficient to establish a complete defense to the targeted claims, or to show that the plaintiff will be unable to prove an essential element. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851. Simply joining the motion of another party does not satisfy this requirement.
But on a special motion to strike, the moving defendant need only demonstrate that the action arises out of protected First Amendment activity. Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365. In Barak v. Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660-661, the Court concluded that so long as one defendant met that burden, others could join.
But don’t take this too far. Obviously, if the complaint alleges different types of wrongdoing by the defendants, the court may not be able to rule as to the joining defendant. Complicating matters further, there were problems with the plaintiff’s opposition in Barak.
Nonetheless, if you find yourself in a situation where one of the other defendants has filed an anti-SLAPP motion, take a hard look to determine if it would make sense to join in the motion.
Mandated Arbitration Does Not Create a “Protected Activity”
A decision that involves both beer and anti-SLAPP law is right up my alley, so I had to bring you the details of Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company, LLC out of the Second District.
The importance of this case is the lesson it teaches in focusing on whether the conduct in question is indeed “protected activity” such that it satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. As I have stated here before, the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute has grown and grown, but attorneys must not give short shrift to the first prong.
I. Facts Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: Beer Law, LLC, Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company | No Comments »
SLAPP023 – Privileged Speech Can Survive Anti-SLAPP Motions
In Episode 23 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we examine two cases that consider how privileged speech should be viewed during the two-prong anti-SLAPP analysis. As you will hear, the fact that the speech was privileged does not mean it automatically falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Edalati v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
This unpublished case is our starting point. In Edalati, a dentist learned that Kaiser Foundation Health Plan had sent a letter to dozens of her patients, falsely informing them that the dentist was on a government list for Medicare abuse. Kaiser realized it’s mistake and sent out a retraction letter, but by that point the damage had been done. The dentist sued for defamation, and Kaiser responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.
Kaiser’s letter clearly falls under the common interest privilege of Civil Code section 47, but is that enough to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion?
Lefebvre v. Lefebvre
In opposition to Kaiser’s anti-SLAPP motion, the dentist in Edalati relied on the case of Lefebvre v. Lefebvre. In that case, a wife, in the hope that it would help in a custody dispute, filed a false police report against her husband, claiming he had threatened to kill her and their children. He was arrested and charged. He was found not guilty, and then sued his ex-wife for defamation. The wife brought an anti-SLAPP motion.
The report to the police enjoys an absolute privilege, so the anti-SLAPP motion must have been granted, right? Don’t be so sure. Listen to this latest episode to find out. Here’s a hint. The case law discussed in this episode offers a means to save attorneys and their clients from an award of attorney fees when they end up on the wrong side of an anti-SLAPP motion.
A great, FREE program
The publisher stopped supporting and offering a fantastic program called Notescraps that I use every day in my practice. I not only prevailed on them to keep offering the program, I got them to give it to you for free (it used to be $20). I tell you how to get it on this episode.
Book ’em Danno.
And finally, just for fun, I tell the tale of my encounter with some officious deputies at the courthouse. I still made it to court and still won my motion.
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SLAPP022 – Abuse of Process Claims and Anti-SLAPP Motions
Hooray for Hollywood! In Episode 22 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we discuss four cases involving the film industry that have all resulted in anti-SLAPP motions. We also dive deep into abuse of process claims, and determine if such claims can ever survive an anti-SLAPP motion. And in the process, we discuss a trial strategy that I successfully utilized in achieving a case involving the Automotive Repair Act.
Cases discussed in this Episode:
Kelly Van v. James Cameron (unpublished).
In this case, and author named Kelly Van sued James Cameron and a cast of thousands, claiming that Avatar was a ripoff of her book, Sheila the Warrior; the Damned. When she lost the copyright action in Federal Court, she sued in state court, claiming that she only lost the federal action because the defendants had lied. So she was suing for statements made in another case. Sounds like a SLAPP to me.
Timothy Forsyth v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
In this class action, the plaintiff claims that depictions of smoking in the movies are killing our children. They claim it is a violation of the movie rating system to give a movie a PG-13 rating if the movie depicts smoking (such as Gandalf smoking his pipe in the Lord of the Rings movies). So the plaintiff gets to tell the movie industry how to rate movies? Sounds like a SLAPP to me.
Paul Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment (unpublished).
In the 70s, Paul Brodeur told the world that microwave ovens were dangerous, but he never said the cook the nutrients out of food. In the film American Hustle, a fictional charater makes the fictional statement that Paul Brodeur said that microwaves cook the nutrients out of food. So Brodeur gets to tell the movie industry how to write the fictional dialog of its fictional characters? Sounds like a SLAPP to me.
Michael Hawkins v. Christian Slater (Superior Court case)
For a brief shining moment in Camelot, Christian Slater reunited with his actor father, Michael Hawkins. They had had a turbulent relationship, but Slater announced in an interview that he was happy to have his father back in his life, describing his father as a “manic-depressive schizophrenic.” His father sued for defamation, and Slater brought an anti-SLAPP motion. So Hawkins thinks that Slater is qualified to offer a medical diagnosis, such that his statement would be taken as a verifiable statement? Sounds like a SLAPP to me.
Rusheen v. Cohen (Supreme Court Decision).
The Supreme Court case that tells all about abuse of process claims. Every abuse of process claim will be met with an anti-SLAPP motion. Here is the information you need to determine if your abuse of process claim will survive that motion.
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SLAPP021 – Anti-SLAPP Motions Against Mixed Causes of Action
We discuss the very important case of Baral v. Schnitt, in which the California Supreme Court finally dealt with the split of authorities regarding how to deal with complaints with mixed causes of action; those that contain allegations of both protected and unprotected activities. This is probably the most important anti-SLAPP decision of the decade.
We also take a quick look at Hassell v. Bird, in which the Court of Appeal held that Yelp can be ordered to take down a false and defamatory post, even if it was not a party to the action.
Finally, I tell the tale of a very entertaining victory we had in Norwalk Superior Court, in front of a finger-wagging judge.
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Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court – Some Judges Still Complaining
On August 3, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in the case Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America v. Robert Hirsh.
The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Robert Hirsh’s anti-SLAPP motion (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16) to strike the second amended complaint filed by Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America. Hirsh had alleged that Travelers’ claims arose out of his representation of Travelers’ insured, Visemer De Gelt, as Cumis counsel; and his activity was therefore protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
The Ninth Circuit held that because Travelers’ causes of action were not based on an act in furtherance of Hirsh’s right of petition or free speech, they did not “arise from” protected activity, and thus did not satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The Court also held that Travelers established a probability of prevailing on the merits sufficient to survive a motion to strike. The Court further held that California’s litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b), did not bar the suit because the causes of action arose from Hirsh’s post-settlement conduct, not his communications with De Gelt in settling a prior lawsuit.
Should we allow anti-SLAPP motions in Federal Court?
But like a number of appellate judges in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski and Judge Gould, although they concurred in the opinion, could not pass up the opportunity to complain about how anti-SLAPP motions in federal court were making them work too hard. Judge Kozinski decried that the existing case law is wrong, and he would urge the court to follow the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, which held that anti-SLAPP motions do not belong in federal court because they directly conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the very least, Judge Kozinski urged the court to reconsider the holding in Batzel v. Smith, which allows defendants who lose anti-SLAPP motions to bring an immediate interlocutory appeal.
With all due respect, the reasoning of Judge Kozinski does not withstand scrutiny, as will be shown hereinbelow. What follows is Judge Kozinski’s concurring opinion, with my response to him in red on each of his points. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: Judge Kozinski, Travelers Casualty Insurance Company | No Comments »
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