Anti-SLAPP motion
Imprecise Pleading Will Run Afoul of the Anti-SLAPP Statute
The SS Imprecise Pleading
The legal profession is like a cargo ship. When a cargo ship decides on a new course, the change is slow and ponderous. When the Supreme Court issues an opinion, the time for that decision to filter down to counsel is equally slow and ponderous.
An attorney who didn’t get the memo.
For example, my last article spoke of the attorney who just this past month based his anti-SLAPP motion on authority holding that any report to the police is absolutely privileged. But that hasn’t been the law for over two years. A report to the police is now only conditionally privileged, and all of the authorities he cited have been superseded.
And so it is with the holding of Baral v. Schnitt, in which the California Supreme Court decided how causes of action with both protected and unprotected speech should be handled. Despite being seven years old, it seems that most attorneys are unaware of the holding.
Which brings us to today’s case study.
Four plaintiffs sued the same defendant, alleging defamation and breach of contract. The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion against all four plaintiffs, and their attorney announced that she would oppose the motion, confident that she would succeed in defeating it.
One of the plaintiffs wanted a second opinion, and came to me. After meeting with me and seeing the veins in my skull expand as all the knowledge passed through, he decided to hire me to oppose the motion. The other three plaintiffs (who hadn’t seen the bulging veins thing) stayed with the original counsel.
So there were two opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion – mine and the original attorney’s. As to my client, the motion was denied. As to the other three, the motion was granted. My client is off the hook for any attorney fees.
Lest you think I worked some kind of voodoo magic to get a result like that, my client’s situation was different from the rest, and I was able to capitalize on the distinction. The other three were not similarly situated.
But here is what I observed.
Baral v. Schnitt allows the court to go into the complaint with a scalpel and cut out any allegations of privileged speech. It is not enough for a plaintiff’s attorney to simply conclude that there is enough in the action to meet the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. That’s all fine and good to keep the action moving forward, but if defense counsel can point to individual allegations that involve protected speech, and then plaintiff’s counsel can’t satisfy the second prong as to those allegations, the motion will be granted.
Here is an example of how this comes up, based on one of my pending motions, but modified to preserve privacy. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Slander Requires a Witness
You can’t prove slander without a witness.
I recently prevailed on back to back anti-SLAPP motions based on this simple defamation concept that often alludes attorneys and their clients. Plaintiffs bring a defamation action based on the assumption that the defendant is running around slandering them, but they have no witness to the alleged slander.
Apparently they assume that having filed the action, they will then be able to use the discovery process to find a witness. But this approach leaves them completely vulnerable to my anti-SLAPP motion. So long as I can convince the court that the alleged statements fall under the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff is left with no means to satisfy the second prong of the analysis. They can’t prove that they are more likely than not to succeed on the action, since they can’t provide a witness to the statement. How can they prove the statement was defamatory, if they can’t prove that it was ever made?
I often have to explain this same reality to potential clients who want to hire me to pursue the action. They want to do exactly what the aforesaid plaintiffs did, that left them open to my attack. So the realities of prosecuting a slander action warrants a discussion on this site.
Don’t sue for slander if you don’t have a witness.
Let’s begin with some definitions. As you likely know, if one is defamed in writing, that is libel, and if the defamation is spoken, that is slander.
In the case of libel, you can show the defamation by offering the written document. This can make it easier to prove the case, since the evidence is right there in black and white. However, it is not as simple as some assume.
For example, let’s make you Sue Smith, and you live at 123 Main Street. You wake up one morning and while reading the paper over a cup of coffee (yes, there are some of us who still enjoy reading the paper), you come across an article that says, “Police report that Sue Smith, who resides at 123 Main St., was booked on suspicion of drunk driving. Officer Dave Friendly stated that this was Smith’s third drunk driving arrest, making it a felony.” None of it is true. Probably because of some snafu, the police got it wrong.
Do you have a viable defamation action? Most people who call want to sue the newspaper, but for the reasons set forth in this article, most likely that is a nonstarter.
The person who told the lie is Officer Friendly. So can you sue Officer Friendly, since the paper quoted him? Possibly, but even though the defamatory statement is right there in writing, you don’t yet have an action. How do we know Officer Friendly really said such a thing? It could be that the good officer said something completely different, and your action will be against the newspaper for getting it wrong. News outlets are protected when they accurately quote a public official, even if the official is wrong, but they’ll have to show that Officer Friendly really said what they say he said.
Slander is even tougher. Read the rest of this entry »
SLAPP033 – How to Defeat an anti-SLAPP Motion with Inadmissible Evidence
In Episode 33 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we revisit the California Supreme Court decision of Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co. Our client was sued by an attorney, and we had the action dismissed by way of an anti-SLAPP motion. The attorney appealed, and in his briefs, he never mentioned the Sweetwater holding, and we sure were not going to bring it up. The Court of Appeal brought it up anyway. Would the attorney be able to reverse the ruling, based on evidence that might be admissible at trial?
We also discuss how sometimes the best thing to do is nothing. We were brought in to oppose an anti-SLAPP motion, but when the trial court kept continuing the hearing, I told the client, “wait for it, wait for it . . .”
And I tell the tale of nice woman who ran afoul of the anti-SLAPP statute with her cross-complaint, and was faced with a massive attorney fee application. She could not afford to hire us, but a little guidance from the wings saved her from disaster.
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A Curious Anti-SLAPP Victory Tale
The Saga of a Curious anti-SLAPP Victory Begins
A prospective client sent me a complaint he had received, thinking it might be a SLAPP. When I began handling anti-SLAPP matters almost 20 years ago, most attorneys were unaware of the law, let alone clients. I now get a surprising number of clients who are already aware of the law when they call, either from other attorneys who have referred them to me, or from their own research.
I reviewed the complaint, and after discussing the details with the client, I decided it was indeed a SLAPP.
Here are the facts.
The defendant, my client, grew concerned when he saw some bruises on his young grandchild. The child’s father had divorced, and after some questioning, the child reluctantly revealed that his mother’s new boyfriend was responsible for the bruises. My client immediately notified his son (the child’s father), who contacted the police and took the child to the hospital. The doctor, as a mandated reporter, contacted Child Protective Services.
The alleged abuser sued my client for defamation, and a myriad of other claims, alleging he had falsely reported child abuse to both the police and the doctor at the hospital.
Defamation is vastly different than personal injury.
I checked the website of the firm representing the Plaintiff. On the website, the attorneys refer to themselves as “The Talent.” I saw that their primary practice areas appear to be criminal law and personal injury. That explained a lot. I have encountered this phenomenon on a number of occasions. Personal injury attorneys bring defamation actions, assuming they will flesh out the facts through discovery as the action proceeds. Read the rest of this entry »
How I Defeated an anti-SLAPP Motion by Doing Almost Nothing
Sometimes delay can be a good thing. Here is the tale of an anti-SLAPP motion defeated by time.
Because of certain changed circumstances, a massive company, we’ll call it Optimus, found itself in a bad situation. The facts are very complicated, but here is a simplified, made-up analogy that will set the scene.
Picture that Optimus is in the cold-remedy business, and a number of its formulations contain acetaminophen. But one day it is discovered that when acetaminophen is aerosolized, it cures baldness, and can be sold at a much higher price for that purpose. All of the suppliers want to bail on providing acetaminophen to Optimus, so Optimus comes up with a complaint it intends to use across the country against its suppliers, to force them to honor their agreements. Optimus knows that the suppliers will claim that the new use is a better use for the acetaminophen, because curing baldness is obviously the best conceivable use of any drug, especially as compared to a little pain and fever relief during a cold. The complaint by Optimus will challenge that legal theory and, if successful, will get all its other providers back into line. Read the rest of this entry »
You Can Now Be Sued for Calling the Police
California recently turned defamation law on its ear, as regards calling the police. Let me set the scene with a hypothetical that will demonstrate what California has done.
You and your neighbor Bob have an ongoing dispute about whether your visitors can park on the street in front of his house. During a small gathering at your home, you happen to look out the window and see Bob spray painting “no parking!” on one of your guest’s cars. You report the incident to the police, and after seeing paint on Bob’s fingers matching the paint on the car, they take him away for booking.
Bob is quite a jerk, and is already on probation for a prior criminal offense. If he can’t figure out a way to beat this rap, he is going to spend some time in jail. So he comes up with a brilliant strategy.
He decides he will sue you in civil court for defamation, claiming you lied when you told the police that you saw him vandalizing the car. Whether or not he will win is of no importance. Rather, his plan is to make you spend tens of thousands of dollars fighting his defamation claim. You will soon realize that you really gain nothing by having Bob prosecuted, beyond seeing justice done. You will at some point ask yourself, “is that justice worth the $50,000 or more I am going to spend on attorneys, fighting against this defamation claim?”
SLAPP032 – The 3 Most-Often Miscited Anti-SLAPP Cases
We begin Episode 32 with the discussion of how Morris & Stone just defeated an anti-SLAPP motion. I reveal the common (and fatal) mistake made by defense counsel when they pursue anti-SLAPP motions.
And on the topic of mistakes, based on my prior article, we turn to the three cases that counsel almost always cite improperly when defending against an anti-SLAPP motion. Listen and find out what these three cases really stand for:
Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858.
Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122.
Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299.
Finally, in the after-show, I reveal a successful strategy to obtain a trial continuance, even when the judge has already said no.
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SLAPP030 – Is it Defamatory to Call Someone a “Crook?”
Fun, fun, fun in the California sun at Morris & Stone.
In just the past couple of weeks, we (1) Obtained a 3.9 million dollar defamation verdict for one client; (2) Got another client out of a 7 million dollar case on a motion for summary judgment, and (3) Were awarded our fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion, even though the motion did not dispose of every cause of action.
In Episode 30 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we discuss the facts of the aforementioned anti-SLAPP motion, and the motion for attorney fees that followed. This particular anti-SLAPP motion presented some really interesting issues, as did the motion for attorney fees.
As to the anti-SLAPP motion, we examine whether it can ever be defamatory to call someone a crook. It might seem so, but how exactly does one define a crook in order to offer evidence that one is not a crook?
As to the motion for attorney fees, how does the court handle such a request when the underlying anti-SLAPP motion was only partially successful?
Along the way, we are again reminded why it is so crucial to know the procedural rules governing any motion you bring.
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FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify – Supreme Court Further Defines “Issue of Public Interest”
Time to discuss the very important opinion by the California Supreme Court in the case of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify. To fully understand this opinion and the reasoning behind it, it is necessary to read the entire opinion, because it beautifully builds from the roots of the anti-SLAPP statute all the way to the ultimate conclusion. But in case you don’t have that kind of time, I’ll summarize it up front, and then offer a guided tour through the opinion.
The Facts and Legal Holdings of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify.
FilmOn.com Inc. (FilmOn) is a for-profit business entity that distributes web-based entertainment programming. In this case, FilmOn sued DoubleVerify Inc. (DoubleVerify), another for-profit business entity that offers online tracking, verification and “brand safety” services to Internet advertisers. In other words, DoubleVerify offers its conclusions about sites and content, so advertisers can be sure their ads do not end up in places they might consider to be inappropriate. FilmOn did not like what DoubleVerify had reported to its clients, and sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s unfair competition law.
DoubleVerify responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which was granted by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Judge Terry Green presiding. The Court of Appeal agreed with Judge Green’s conclusion that DoubleVerify’s reports “concerned issues of interest to the public” because “the public has a demonstrable interest in knowing what content is available on the Internet, especially with respect to adult content and the illegal distribution of copyrighted materials.” To support its conclusion, the court analogized DoubleVerify’s confidential reports to ratings by the Motion Picture Association of America, writing, “the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) engages in conduct quite similar to DoubleVerify’s activities by rating movies concerning their level of adult content, and the MPAA does so, because the public cares about the issue.”
It is always a hail Mary to appeal to the California Supreme Court, but surprisingly the Court elected to take up this matter, “to decide whether the commercial nature of a defendant’s speech is relevant in determining whether that speech merits protection under the catchall provision. To resolve this question, we also clarify how the context of a statement more broadly – including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech – informs the same analysis.”
In a unanimous decision, the Supremes reversed the Court of Appeal, and sent the case back to Judge Green for an order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. In essence, as I have repeated here a hundred times, the Court found that context is everything. It found that determining whether the ratings issued by DoubleVerify are a matter of public interest is not viewed in a vacuum. Rather, even if it is concluded that the speech is a matter of public interest, that speech must be in furtherance of the speech on the topic.
It is by carefully observing this wedding of content and context that we can discern if conduct is “in furtherance of” free speech “in connection with” a public issue or issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) What this union of content and context lets us discern in this case is that DoubleVerify’s report does not qualify for protection under the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.
Using a Defamation Action to Gather Evidence of the Defamation is a Risky Proposition
Watch for the anti-SLAPP trap.
People love to gossip, and they love to tell you that you are being gossiped about. But gossip is not evidence. It is a risky proposition to rely on gossip for a defamation action.
I receive calls from prospective clients who are absolutely confident that someone is defaming them. But do they have a witness to testify to what is being said? Can they offer an email as evidence? Perhaps a posting on social media? Well, no, but all I need to do is to file a complaint for them, and then we can start taking depositions to get to the heart of it.
That is a very dangerous course to chart.
In some rare circumstances, that might be viable, but watch for the ever present specter of an anti-SLAPP motion. A call today demonstrated the risks once again. The call was from an attorney, who thought he had been snared by the anti-SLAPP trap, and was seeking my guidance on how he might extricate himself.
(Changing the facts sufficiently to protect privacy), the attorney represents an employee in a wrongful termination action. The client was of course upset about being terminated, claiming that it resulted from him reporting illegal conduct, but he was equally upset about the lies the employer had supposedly told to the EDD and others, about the supposed malfeasance that had led to his termination. The client assumes that the lies were not confined to the EDD, based on some comments by a third party after his termination. The attorney knew enough about anti-SLAPP law that he steered clear of suing for the statements made to the EDD, but the defamation cause of action basically mirrored what the employer had said to the EDD.
For example, let’s say that the employer informed the EDD that the employee was fired after being seen double dipping his chips in the onion dip at a company luncheon; an act we would all agree is proper grounds for termination. Later, he goes into a bar, and when he tries to take the stool next to some other patron, that person says, “get away from me you disgusting double-dipper!” So the employee knows that the employer must be spreading the lie beyond the EDD, since why else would the person have made that statement? Based on this set of circumstances, the attorney alleged that the employer is defaming the terminated employee to third parties.
But now the employer has filed an anti-SLAPP motion, claiming that the employer made that statement only to the EDD, so the employee must be suing for statements made to the EDD, which is protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. Now, faced with the anti-SLAPP motion, what evidence can the attorney offer to prove the statement was made to a third party? All he has is a random statement from some unidentified person at a bar. You just can’t bet your client’s money on the assumption that you will be able to uncover a witness to support your defamation claim, especially since an anti-SLAPP motion freezes discovery (subject to leave by the court).
There might still be hope.
The case presents an interesting issue. The employer will clearly prevail on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, since the employer will simply provide a declaration stating no one within the company made the statement to any third party other than the EDD, and the plaintiff will have no evidence to counter it. But I told the attorney there is hope.
The complaint does not say that Plaintiff is suing for the statements to the EDD. Defendant is attempting to rewrite the allegations to match its recitation of the facts. Plaintiff’s action will not carry the day absent any evidence of the statements to third parties, but he might survive the anti-SLAPP motion by explaining that the allegations as stated – not as defendant chooses to interpret them – do not bring the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.
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