Case Results
Is a Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order Subject to an Anti-SLAPP Motion?
Restraining Orders and anti-SLAPP Motions
A very interesting issue arose in an anti-SLAPP matter that was brought to me. It involved a pretty specific situation that I have encountered only once before, but I think a research article is in order, to assist others who might find themselves in the same situation. The case arose from the client’s (Petitioner) obnoxious neighbor (Respondent). Suffice to say that Respondent had over the years engaged in annoying and threatening behavior, and our client had had enough. At the suggestion of the police, she filed an application for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order.
The Judicial Council has created forms to be used for this purpose, and like any form, it is at best a loosely fitting tool for the job. Petitioner filled out the forms the best she could, and attached a declaration to provide some additional facts she thought would be relevant for the court’s analysis.
In her declaration, she told the story of how she had repeatedly called the police in an effort to address Respondent’s harassment. She then said that in response to one of these calls to the police, Respondent had retaliated by making his own police report.
Oops. Reports to the police fall under the anti-SLAPP statute, so that afforded Respondent the opportunity to bring an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike that “allegation.”
Petitioner didn’t know how to deal with the motion, and just showed up on the date set for the restraining order hearing. Thankfully, the court put off that determination so the anti-SLAPP motion could be heard, and set a briefing schedule. Petitioner then hired the Sultan of SLAPP, moi. Read the rest of this entry »
How I Defeated an anti-SLAPP Motion by Doing Almost Nothing
Sometimes delay can be a good thing. Here is the tale of an anti-SLAPP motion defeated by time.
Because of certain changed circumstances, a massive company, we’ll call it Optimus, found itself in a bad situation. The facts are very complicated, but here is a simplified, made-up analogy that will set the scene.
Picture that Optimus is in the cold-remedy business, and a number of its formulations contain acetaminophen. But one day it is discovered that when acetaminophen is aerosolized, it cures baldness, and can be sold at a much higher price for that purpose. All of the suppliers want to bail on providing acetaminophen to Optimus, so Optimus comes up with a complaint it intends to use across the country against its suppliers, to force them to honor their agreements. Optimus knows that the suppliers will claim that the new use is a better use for the acetaminophen, because curing baldness is obviously the best conceivable use of any drug, especially as compared to a little pain and fever relief during a cold. The complaint by Optimus will challenge that legal theory and, if successful, will get all its other providers back into line. Read the rest of this entry »
Understanding Anti-SLAPP Evidence
Another great victory by Morris & Stone, and an important lesson on anti-SLAPP evidence.
Our tale begins with a father who loved his daughter. We’ll call him Dad, and his daughter will be Rose.
Dad thought married life was good, and he and his wife begat their wonderful daughter Rose. But his wife (we’ll call her Mom) apparently saw greener grass, and divorced Dad to marry New Guy, meaning that Rose would now be spending time with New Guy.
Reports from Rose about her time with New Guy were disturbing. She claimed that New Guy had spanked her, and one time she returned home with a badly bruised arm she blamed on New Guy. During the ongoing custody battle, Dad reported his concerns about New Guy to the court in various court documents, stating that based on what Rose was reporting, he was being too forceful with Rose. Dad freely admitted he had no personal knowledge of any of this; he was only reporting what Rose was telling him. What else was he supposed to do?
The Litigation Privilege and Collateral Defamation Actions
I get the same question a couple of times a week, so I decided that a article on the litigation privilege is in order, so I will have a place to send potential clients for a detailed discussion. (I also briefly discuss the police report privilege.)
The question from potential clients almost always comes up in the context of wanting to start a collateral action* for defamation in response to something that is being said in some other court action. Here are the most common examples:
— A husband is going through a divorce, and his wife or a witness or the wife’s attorney filed a declaration with the court stating that he was physically abusive to the children. He wants to file an action against his wife (or the witness or the attorney) for defamation for the false claims made in the declaration.
— Someone is seeking or has obtained a restraining order against the caller, and in support of the request for a restraining order the person filed false declarations and gave false testimony in court. The caller has absolute proof, including emails and recordings, showing that the statements were false. The caller wants to sue for defamation because of all the false statements, which are now a matter of public record. They are concerned that if they don’t “clear their name” the lies will prevent them from working in their profession.
— An attorney sent a letter to an employee’s employer, claiming that the employee stole property and trade secrets from his former employer, and threatening to sue if the property is not returned or if the employer makes use of any of the trade secrets. Based on the letter, the company fires the employee rather than to run the risk of a lawsuit. The employee did not take any property from the former employer and is not using any trade secrets, and wants to sue the former employer and its attorney for defamation.
— An employee is suing for wrongful termination, and the deposition of one of his former co-workers is taken. At that deposition, the co-worker falsely claims that she was sexually harassed by the employee suing for wrongful termination. As a result of this claim, the court grants a motion for summary judgment and throws out the action, and the employee’s marriage is severely strained because of the claim of infidelity. The employee wants to sue the co-worker for defamation for what she said at her deposition.
— A person is sued for fraud, and in the complaint there are dozens of false allegations, stating that the defendant engaged in illegal conduct and made misrepresentations to the plaintiff in order to cheat her out of money. After the complaint is served, the plaintiff dismisses the action, but the complaint is now a matter of public record, and anyone doing a search on the Internet can find this complaint with all its lies. The defendant wants to sue for defamation.
Statements Made in Conjunction with Litigation are Privileged
None of the above circumstances would permit an action for defamation. A quick definition is necessary to explain why. Defamation requires an UNPRIVILEGED false statement. Therefore, if a statement is privileged, it cannot be defamatory.
Posted in Case Results, Defamation, Defamation Solutions, Evidence, Libel, Litigation, Slander, Trial, Wrongful Termination | Tags: Aaron Morris, Collateral Actions, Defamation, Litigation Privilege | 5 Comments »
The Top Three anti-SLAPP Cases Every Defense Attorney Cites, Whether they Apply or Not
Although the legal community appears to have come far in the past 30 years as regards awareness of the anti-SLAPP statute, it is still often the case that when I bring an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff’s attorney is caught totally unawares. Even in those cases where I have warned opposing counsel of my intention to bring the motion, it is usually apparent that they thought it would not be an issue, based on some miscomprehension of what the statute covers.
This leaves them to scramble to try and find some basis to challenge the anti-SLAPP motion, and in doing so they inevitably cite to one or more of the following three cases. Sadly, they almost always cite these cases in ways that do not apply.
I will identify the top three cases cited by defense counsel, and explain why they almost never apply. Read the rest of this entry »
SLAPP031 – A Gambler Bets Wrong on the Anti-SLAPP Statute
In Episode 31, in addition to an anti-SLAPP case, we examine another example of how opposing counsel blew an opposition to our Motion for Summary Judgment, by being unaware of the procedure rules.
The limit for the memorandum of points on a typical motion is 15 pages, but a motion for summary judgment is a big deal, so the rules graciously allow 20 pages for that type of motion. The same rule applies to the opposition. But this attorney offered up a 60 page memo. How did we use that error to seal his doom? Listen to Episode 31 to find out.
Next we turn to the case of Mike Postle, a professional gambler. Some accused Postle of cheating at a particular poker tournament. He took umbrage with that, and sued 12 of his accusers. We would have told poor Mr. Postle the tale of Joe the Alcoholic, which made clear that he could not prevail on his defamation claim. Listen for all the details, and the only possible silver lining in Postle’s debacle.
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SLAPP029 – Can Attorneys Sue Their Clients for Malicious Prosecution After a Fee Dispute?
In episode 28, we discussed the attorney who sued his own client for malicious prosecution. The client had challenged the fees charged by the attorney by way of the informal fee arbitration process, and when he lost the attorney turned around and sued for malicious prosecution.
Incredibly, the court denied our motion, so we had to take it up on appeal.
The Court of Appeal agreed with our position that a fee arbitration cannot be the predicate for a malicious prosecution case, and therefore the attorney could not possibly prevail on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
In Episode 29, we discuss the court’s decision, as well as the motion for attorney fees that followed. The attorney provided a 65-page report from an expert witness who challenged our fees and hourly rate, but the judge was having none of it.
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FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify – Supreme Court Further Defines “Issue of Public Interest”
Time to discuss the very important opinion by the California Supreme Court in the case of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify. To fully understand this opinion and the reasoning behind it, it is necessary to read the entire opinion, because it beautifully builds from the roots of the anti-SLAPP statute all the way to the ultimate conclusion. But in case you don’t have that kind of time, I’ll summarize it up front, and then offer a guided tour through the opinion.
The Facts and Legal Holdings of FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify.
FilmOn.com Inc. (FilmOn) is a for-profit business entity that distributes web-based entertainment programming. In this case, FilmOn sued DoubleVerify Inc. (DoubleVerify), another for-profit business entity that offers online tracking, verification and “brand safety” services to Internet advertisers. In other words, DoubleVerify offers its conclusions about sites and content, so advertisers can be sure their ads do not end up in places they might consider to be inappropriate. FilmOn did not like what DoubleVerify had reported to its clients, and sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s unfair competition law.
DoubleVerify responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, which was granted by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Judge Terry Green presiding. The Court of Appeal agreed with Judge Green’s conclusion that DoubleVerify’s reports “concerned issues of interest to the public” because “the public has a demonstrable interest in knowing what content is available on the Internet, especially with respect to adult content and the illegal distribution of copyrighted materials.” To support its conclusion, the court analogized DoubleVerify’s confidential reports to ratings by the Motion Picture Association of America, writing, “the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) engages in conduct quite similar to DoubleVerify’s activities by rating movies concerning their level of adult content, and the MPAA does so, because the public cares about the issue.”
It is always a hail Mary to appeal to the California Supreme Court, but surprisingly the Court elected to take up this matter, “to decide whether the commercial nature of a defendant’s speech is relevant in determining whether that speech merits protection under the catchall provision. To resolve this question, we also clarify how the context of a statement more broadly – including the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech – informs the same analysis.”
In a unanimous decision, the Supremes reversed the Court of Appeal, and sent the case back to Judge Green for an order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. In essence, as I have repeated here a hundred times, the Court found that context is everything. It found that determining whether the ratings issued by DoubleVerify are a matter of public interest is not viewed in a vacuum. Rather, even if it is concluded that the speech is a matter of public interest, that speech must be in furtherance of the speech on the topic.
It is by carefully observing this wedding of content and context that we can discern if conduct is “in furtherance of” free speech “in connection with” a public issue or issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) What this union of content and context lets us discern in this case is that DoubleVerify’s report does not qualify for protection under the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute.
A Huge Anti-SLAPP Victory by Morris & Stone in the Court of Appeal
J. Niley Dorit v. Noe
At Morris & Stone, we sometimes take a case with an eye toward the greater legal implications. Prevailing for the client is of course our number one goal, but occasionally it is clear that the case could have legal implications beyond the dispute between the parties. This was such a case. It began as a, “well, that can’t be right” case, and morphed into a precedent that will control a small part of anti-SLAPP law until the universe reaches heat death.
Yet, it all started out so simply . . .
In January 2018, our client (we’ll call him Jack because that’s his name) hired an attorney named J. Niley Dorit to evaluate the medical records of Jack’s deceased mother for a potential medical malpractice suit against her doctors. The parties signed a fee agreement in which Jack agreed to pay Dorit a $10,000 non-refundable retainer fee. This sum was intended to cover Dorit’s time spent evaluating the claim, as well as “the costs of additional medical records and/or expert medical review if indicated.” The agreement contained an arbitration clause, which stated, “Should there arise any disagreement as to the amount of attorneys fees and/or costs, Client agrees to enter into binding arbitration of such issue or dispute before the Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF).”
On March 19, 2018, Dorit called Jack on the phone to present his analysis of the records. According to Dorit, Jack cut him off soon after Dorit began his presentation. Jack asked Dorit simply to provide his ultimate conclusion about the potential malpractice claim. Dorit said he did not think a malpractice claim was viable.
Jack was frustrated, feeling that Dorit had not provided $10,000 worth of services, especially given that he apparently had not consulted any medical experts. Conversely, Dorit felt that his experience with medical malpractice cases qualified him to review the file sufficiently to determine if a malpractice case was warranted. The medical file was huge, so Dorit felt he had earned his fee in examining the file.
The Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act
This is the sort of situation envisioned when the MFAA was was created. MFAA stands for Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act. Under California law, a client can challenge the fees charged by their attorney using this State Bar regulated process. It is designed to be very informal, and the arbitrator is not even required to follow the rules of evidence. It is a quick, low-cost way to have a fee dispute decided. Often the attorney fees involved in a fee dispute are relatively nominal, and it would never make economic sense to have to sue in court, let alone hire yet another attorney to do so. Rather than to force clients to stew in their own juices over the anger of having no recourse, the MFAA provides a quick review of the fees paid. And contrary to popular belief that the process is rigged in favor of attorneys, the MFAA arbitrators are very strict in determining if the attorney has observed all legal requirements.
Thus, a perfect process existed for Jack and Dorit to have the dispute decided, without going to court or even squaring off at ten paces. They submitted the fee dispute to MFAA arbitration. They presented their evidence to the Arbitrator, and ultimately he found in favor of Dorit, and allowed him to keep the $10,000 fee, awarding Jack nothing. Jack even had to cover the filing fee.
There are a couple of important things to know about the MFAA process. By law, a client always has the option to submit any fee dispute to arbitration. Sometimes it is the attorney who wants to sue to recover unpaid fees, but the attorney cannot take the matter to court without first giving the client the option to submit the dispute to arbitration. At that point, the arbitration is non-binding, unless the client then agrees to make it binding. If it is non-binding, then either party is free to reject the award of the Arbitrator and proceed to court.
Additionally, since the arbitration is so informal, and does not follow the rules of evidence, nothing from the arbitration can be used in any subsequent court proceeding. For example, had this matter proceeded to trial, Dorit would not have been permitted to bring up the fact that he had won the arbitration, or to bring up any of the arbitration testimony. It’s simply as though it never happened. This is because it would be entirely unfair to have a situation where clients are encouraged to go to an informal arbitration without the benefit of legal counsel, but then allow the attorney to use the results of that hearing against the client in some other more formal forum, such as a trial.
OK; you now know everything you need to know about MFAA arbitrations. Back to our tale.
When we left our heroes, Dorit had won, and Jack was very unhappy with the result. But Jack has a code, and that code dictated that he had lost fair and square, and he would live with that result. Even though he would have been free to reject the conclusions of the Arbitrator, he did nothing and allowed the award to become final.
Dorit sues for Malicious Prosecution
But Dorit was not as accommodating. Dorit was upset that Jack had dared to question his entitlement to the $10,000 in fees, which he felt had been a malicious thing to do, so he sued Jack in San Francisco Superior Court for Malicious Prosecution. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: J Niley Dorit, J Niley Dorit Attorney, Phillip Sandoval | 1 Comment »
Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the action?
Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the entire action?
Seemingly, this question has been clearly answered ever since the Supreme Court ruling in Varian Medical Systems v. Delfino, way back in 2005, but I still see a lot of confusion on the topic.
As an example, I recently prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion against an attorney, who was representing herself in a defamation action against my client. After the victory, as is my practice, I asked her if she wanted to pay the current attorney fees in order to avoid the extra expense of the motion for attorney fees.**
She chortled, “You can’t bring a motion for attorney fees, because I filed a notice of appeal regarding the ruling on the motion.”
After I prevailed on my motion for attorney fees, as is my practice, I called counsel to ask if she wanted to pay the (now greater) fees in order to avoid the extra fees for my time spent on collection, and the embarrassment of having her wages garnished at her law firm. (Yes, unlike typical collection efforts, the time spent on collecting attorney fees following an anti-SLAPP motion is recoverable.)
She chortled (what can I say? She’s a chortling fool), “You can’t seek to recover those attorney fees while an appeal is pending.”
We are currently receiving 25% of each of her paychecks while we await a date for oral argument on the appeal.
Allow me to take you through the Varian Medical Systems decision, because it lays out a good summary of the historical background on this point. These are the facts as summarized by the Supreme Court. Read the rest of this entry »
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