Case Results
Mandated Arbitration Does Not Create a “Protected Activity”
A decision that involves both beer and anti-SLAPP law is right up my alley, so I had to bring you the details of Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company, LLC out of the Second District.
The importance of this case is the lesson it teaches in focusing on whether the conduct in question is indeed “protected activity” such that it satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. As I have stated here before, the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute has grown and grown, but attorneys must not give short shrift to the first prong.
I. Facts Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: Beer Law, LLC, Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company | No Comments »
SLAPP023 – Privileged Speech Can Survive Anti-SLAPP Motions
In Episode 23 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we examine two cases that consider how privileged speech should be viewed during the two-prong anti-SLAPP analysis. As you will hear, the fact that the speech was privileged does not mean it automatically falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Edalati v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
This unpublished case is our starting point. In Edalati, a dentist learned that Kaiser Foundation Health Plan had sent a letter to dozens of her patients, falsely informing them that the dentist was on a government list for Medicare abuse. Kaiser realized it’s mistake and sent out a retraction letter, but by that point the damage had been done. The dentist sued for defamation, and Kaiser responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.
Kaiser’s letter clearly falls under the common interest privilege of Civil Code section 47, but is that enough to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion?
Lefebvre v. Lefebvre
In opposition to Kaiser’s anti-SLAPP motion, the dentist in Edalati relied on the case of Lefebvre v. Lefebvre. In that case, a wife, in the hope that it would help in a custody dispute, filed a false police report against her husband, claiming he had threatened to kill her and their children. He was arrested and charged. He was found not guilty, and then sued his ex-wife for defamation. The wife brought an anti-SLAPP motion.
The report to the police enjoys an absolute privilege, so the anti-SLAPP motion must have been granted, right? Don’t be so sure. Listen to this latest episode to find out. Here’s a hint. The case law discussed in this episode offers a means to save attorneys and their clients from an award of attorney fees when they end up on the wrong side of an anti-SLAPP motion.
A great, FREE program
The publisher stopped supporting and offering a fantastic program called Notescraps that I use every day in my practice. I not only prevailed on them to keep offering the program, I got them to give it to you for free (it used to be $20). I tell you how to get it on this episode.
Book ’em Danno.
And finally, just for fun, I tell the tale of my encounter with some officious deputies at the courthouse. I still made it to court and still won my motion.
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Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court – Some Judges Still Complaining
On August 3, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in the case Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America v. Robert Hirsh.
The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Robert Hirsh’s anti-SLAPP motion (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16) to strike the second amended complaint filed by Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America. Hirsh had alleged that Travelers’ claims arose out of his representation of Travelers’ insured, Visemer De Gelt, as Cumis counsel; and his activity was therefore protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
The Ninth Circuit held that because Travelers’ causes of action were not based on an act in furtherance of Hirsh’s right of petition or free speech, they did not “arise from” protected activity, and thus did not satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The Court also held that Travelers established a probability of prevailing on the merits sufficient to survive a motion to strike. The Court further held that California’s litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b), did not bar the suit because the causes of action arose from Hirsh’s post-settlement conduct, not his communications with De Gelt in settling a prior lawsuit.
Should we allow anti-SLAPP motions in Federal Court?
But like a number of appellate judges in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski and Judge Gould, although they concurred in the opinion, could not pass up the opportunity to complain about how anti-SLAPP motions in federal court were making them work too hard. Judge Kozinski decried that the existing case law is wrong, and he would urge the court to follow the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, which held that anti-SLAPP motions do not belong in federal court because they directly conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the very least, Judge Kozinski urged the court to reconsider the holding in Batzel v. Smith, which allows defendants who lose anti-SLAPP motions to bring an immediate interlocutory appeal.
With all due respect, the reasoning of Judge Kozinski does not withstand scrutiny, as will be shown hereinbelow. What follows is Judge Kozinski’s concurring opinion, with my response to him in red on each of his points. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: Judge Kozinski, Travelers Casualty Insurance Company | No Comments »
Supreme Court Finally Applies Anti-SLAPP Statute to Mixed Causes of Action
On August 1, 2016 the California Supreme Court issued an opinion on anti-SLAPP law that will likely prove to be the most impactful decision of this decade.
The Supreme Court used the issues presented by the case of Baral v. Schnitt to finally clear up a split of authority that has existed since at least 2004, namely, what to do with mixed causes of action.
The history of the Courts’ struggles with mixed causes of action.
Porn Star versus Firefighter – The Vagaries of Anti-SLAPP Law
Litigation is never a 100% certainty, as evidenced by the two cases that follow. But an attorney who really knows his or her stuff can certainly mean the difference between victory or defeat. If you are going to enter the murky waters of an anti-SLAPP motion or are contemplating a defamation case that could invoke an anti-SLAPP motion, be sure you have a good anti-SLAPP attorney.
Today we discuss two seemingly identical cases, at least from the legal issues they presented, but which ended in completely opposite results.
The Vagaries of Anti-SLAPP Law
In our first example, The New York Daily News (that bastion of journalism) reported on a sex scandal at the fire department, and the article included two photographs. The first photo was a generic stock photo showing firefighters at the scene of a fire. But the second photo is the one that started the brouhaha. Inexplicably the newspaper chose to use a photo of firefighter Francis Cheney II, taken during a formal 9/11 ceremony. The newspaper’s intent (so they claimed) was simply to use Cheney as a representation of a firefighter. But here was an article about a sex scandal, with a picture of Cheney. How could any reasonable person take that as anything other than an implied reference that Cheney was one of the firefighters involved?
Cheney certainly thought his photo would be taken that way, so he sued the newspaper, claiming that the photo had harmed his reputation by implying that he was one of the firefighters involved in the sex scandal. But a judge in federal court dismissed the action, finding that since the article never mentioned Cheney by name, it was too much of a stretch to assume that readers would think the photo was there because he was a participant.
So, the rule of law appears to be that if your photo is included in a sex scandal story, don’t bother suing, because the court will throw out your case if the other side brings an anti-SLAPP motion, because you won’t be able to prove a likelihood of success on your case. Good to know.
Now we turn to the case of Leah Manzari v. Associated News Ltd. Read the rest of this entry »
‘American Hustle’ Producers Can’t Nuke Defamation Lawsuit – Hollywood Reporter
Paul Brodeur, a science writer who claims he was defamed by something Jennifer Lawrence said in David O. Russell’s 2013 film American Hustle, has survived an attempt to knock out his $1 million lawsuit on First Amendment grounds.
Source: www.hollywoodreporter.com
This is such an entertaining and ridiculous lawsuit.
In the movie American Hustle, Jennifer Lawrence plays a character named Rosalyn. The movie is set in the 70s, when microwave ovens were still relatively new, and Rosalyn makes the statement that microwaves cook the nutrition out of food. When another character questions that claim, she holds up a magazine and responds, “I read it in an article by Paul Brodeur.”
Paul Brodeur is a real person, and claims that the fictional statement from a fictional character hurts his reputation. During the 70s, Brodeur wrote about the dangers of microwave ovens, but he never stated that they take the nutrition out of food, and he therefore claims that the idea that he would have written this (fictional) article stating that food loses its nutrition when cooked in a microwave is akin to having Carl Sagan say that the sun revolves around the earth.
Brodeur should have been flattered that anyone remembered him, and laughed at the joke while enjoying his 15 minutes of renewed fame. But this is America, so he sued for a million dollars, claiming the statement was defamatory. The movie makers responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.
At the time, I expressed concerns about whether the judge would be convinced that the facts presented satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Judges who can’t be made to understand anti-SLAPP law will often be too narrow minded as to what constitute public interest. My concerns were warranted, because the trial judge denied the motion under the first prong.
[UPDATE (June 6, 2016):] Cases such as this continue to show the importance of the automatic right of appeal, even from denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
Paul Brodeur’s ridiculous lawsuit survived the anti-SLAPP motion, which would have doomed the defendant (Atlas Entertainment, Inc.) to litigate issues through trial, were it not for the automatic right of appeal. That ability to demand a second look at the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute resulted in the dismissal of this waste of court resources.
As it had to, the Court of Appeal held:
American Hustle is, after all, a farce. The stage was set at the beginning of the film. (‘Some of this actually happened,’ is the line that appears on screen to start things off, and it sets the tone perfectly.”) The character who utters the allegedly defamatory statement is portrayed throughout the movie as ‘slightly unhinged’ and ‘a font of misinformation,’ and Irving and Rosalyn both refer to the microwave oven as the ‘science oven.’ We doubt any audience member would perceive any of Rosalyn’s dialogue as assertions of objective fact.
The trial court had refused to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, finding no matter of public interest in the film. The Court of Appeal dismissed this position almost out of hand.
[I]t is likewise beyond dispute that the anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of the term “public interest,” is to be construed broadly. (Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1039-1042 [discussing cases and legislative history of 1997 amendment adding the directive to construe the statute broadly].) Nygard concludes: “Taken together, these cases and the legislative history that discusses them suggest that ‘an issue of public interest’ within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) is any issue in which the public is interested. In other words, the issue need not be ‘significant’ to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute — it is enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.
The Court of Appeal found myriad bases of public interest, from the fact that the film was so popular, to the interest the public has in actors and casting, to the interest in the Abscam investigation in particular (upon which the movie is based) and the 1970’s in general.
The second important takeaway from this case is procedural; namely, don’t get so caught up in the minutia that you lose sight of the fundamental points.
Brodeur was all in a tizzy because what he wrote about in the 1970s was that microwave ovens were unsafe due to the radiation they put out. He never claimed that food cooked in a microwave was unsafe, and certainly never claimed that they take the nutrition out of food. The entire point of his case was that he was defamed by the statement of this fictional character, claiming he had written that microwaves take the nutrition out of food. In his unverified complaint, he alleged he “has never written an article or ever declared in any way that a microwave oven ‘takes all of the nutrition out of food.’”
But the allegations of the complaint are not evidence. Thus, in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, the most important evidence to present (at least in the context of the ridiculous claim being made) was that Brodeur had never stated that a microwave takes all of the nutrition out of food. Incredibly, according to the Court of Appeal, Brodeur’s attorneys failed to offer evidence to establish that fact. It could have been established by simply providing a declaration from Brodeur stating exactly what he alleged in his complaint. By failing to do so, Brodeur failed to make a prima facie showing of falsity.
In a defamation action, the specter of an anti-SLAPP motion and the concomitant attorney fees hangs over the complaint like the Sword of Damocles. Far too many attorneys turn a blind eye to this danger, and pursue a defamation claim under the ill-defined idea that the suit will bring a quick settlement, or that they will somehow survive any challenges.
I can’t speak to the mindset of counsel in this case. But someone sat down at a keyboard, and actually typed allegations asserting that the words said in a fictional movie by a fictional character — who was specifically portrayed as not knowing what she was talking about — were actionable. At some point, that should have raised red flags.
When Considering an Anti-SLAPP Motion, Focus on the Gravamen of the Complaint
I am the anti-SLAPP guy, and I’d be the last to criticize creative applications of the anti-SLAPP statute. But sometimes it is as though the attorney bringing an anti-SLAPP motion only read the Cliff Notes on the process. He knows some of the buzz words, such as “public interest” and “protected speech”, but lacks the big picture. When considering an anti-SLAPP motion, you must consider the true gravamen of the complaint.
Case in point is the recent Court of Appeal opinion in Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. B264493), arising from the efforts to build a football stadium in the City of Carson. The ruling of the Court of Appeal, published on May 31, 2016, can be found here.
Carson wanted to build a stadium and entertainment complex, and was hoping to woo the NFL to relocate a team there. Carson hired a lobbyist, of sorts, Richard Rand, giving him an exclusive arrangement to negotiate with the NFL.
Things between Rand and the city got off to a rocky start, leading Rand to successfully sue Carson for civil rights violations, alleging that the Mayor had demanded a bribe. The city and Rand both appealed, with the city claiming it had never happened, and Rand claiming he should get more in damages.
The parties eventually settled, but Carson did not honor Rand’s exclusivity arrangement. Rand sued again, this time for breach of contract and other claims.
“Well,” thought the city’s attorneys, “this whole football stadium thing is generating a ton of public interest, and anti-SLAPP motions can be brought where the situation is a matter of public interest, so let’s bring an anti-SLAPP motion.”
And that’s just what they did. The city challenged Rand’s action with an anti-SLAPP motion.
“Well,” thought the judge, “this whole football stadium thing is generating a ton of public interest, and anti-SLAPP motions can be brought where the situation is a matter of public interest, so I guess I should grant the anti-SLAPP motion.”
And that’s just what he did. Apparently having read the same Cliff Notes, the judge granted the anti-SLAPP motion. Rand appealed. Read the rest of this entry »
SLAPP020 – Sixth District Weighs in on Admissibility of Yelp Reviews and the Law on Inferences
In Episode 20 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we discuss important Evidence Codes, and my VINDICATION by the California Court of Appeal.
The vindication comes in the form of a published opinion from the Sixth District Court of Appeal. I was brought in as co-counsel to first chair an internet defamation trial in Santa Cruz, representing a client (an attorney) we will refer to as “Esquire”. We were also defending a cross-complaint for breach of a commercial lease. The trial was assigned to Judge Ariadne Symons, who by her own admission was probably not the best choice for this case, confessing that she knew nothing about the internet and computers.
At commencement of trial, the defense took one look at our trial brief, and immediately dismissed the cross-complaint, leaving for trial only our complaint for defamation and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Unfortunately, Judge Symons’ fundamental misunderstanding of the rules of evidence, both as to what is necessary to admit documents posted on the internet, and as to indirect evidence and inferences, led to the exclusion of all of our defamation evidence.
I was confident that the matter would be reversed on appeal, and I was looking forward to the Court of Appeal’s opinion, not just for the benefit of the client and my own vindication, but because until the Court of Appeal instructed Judge Symons on fundamental evidentiary law, a lot of parties in her court were going to be deprived of justice. Read the rest of this entry »
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Posted in anti-SLAPP motions, Case Results, Podcasts | Tags: Evidence Code 1552, Judge Ariadne Symons, Santa Cruz Superior Court | No Comments »
SLAPP019 – Five Best Published Anti-SLAPP Decisions (so far) in 2016
On Episode 19 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we go through my five favorite reported anti-SLAPP decisions from the first half of 2016.
But first we begin with a cautionary tale of an attorney who is being sued for malpractice for failing to have me review his complaint before it was filed! (OK, there’s a back story here, so be sure to listen to this episode to find out what I’m talking about.)
Then, we turn to the five best published anti-SLAPP decisions from the first half of 2016. The bold cases are the top five; the non-bolded are other cases I discuss as well.
Lanz v. Goldstone (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 441
Another cautionary tale, this time of an attorney who followed the old adage, “the best defense is a good offense.” He tried to intimidate an attorney from seeking his legal fees, and bought himself a malicious prosecution action in the process. You’ll learn a lot about malicious prosecution actions and under what circumstances they can survive an anti-SLAPP motion.
Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43
Speaking of malicious prosecution actions, this is the seminal case.
Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135
“When the proceeding terminates other than on the merits, the court must examine the REASONS for termination to see if the disposition reflects the opinion of the court OR THE PROSECUTING PARTY that the action would not succeed.”
Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344
Speaking of over-pleading, our second case is Karnazes v. Ares, decided by the Second District in January of 2016. In this case, the plaintiff alleged 22 – count em – 22 causes of action against the defendants. Karnazes lost to an anti-SLAPP motion, but made some interesting arguments in opposition to that motion.
Sweetwater Union School District v. Gilbane Building Company (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 19
Are political bribes protected by the anti-SLAPP statute? Listen to find out (and the answer will likely surprise you). And find out how you can support an anti-SLAPP motion with declarations without using declarations.
Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Association (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 529
It may look like litigation, and it may quack like litigation, but that doesn’t necessarily make it litigation for purposes of the litigation privilege and the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
JM Manufacturing v. Phillips & Cohen (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87
Yet one more action against an attorney; in this case an attorney who was so proud of his firm’s trial victory that he published a press release and bought the firm a defamation action. It was a split decision.
And finally, in the after show, I provide an appeal tip that might save you from some embarrassment.
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SLAPP018 – All You Need to Know About Anti-SLAPP Motions in Federal Court
In episode 18 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, I discuss an anti-SLAPP motion I decided NOT to pursue, and why. We discuss the case of Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122.
Then we dive deep into the pros, cons, and frustrations of bringing anti-SLAPP motions in Federal Court. Since 1999, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the California anti-SLAPP statute can be applied to cases in Federal Court, but the motion you bring there is a very different animal from what is pursued in State Court. As part of our discussion on anti-SLAPP motions in Federal Court, we cover the following cases:
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64
Swift v. Tyson (1842) 41 U.S. 1
United States Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (1999) 171 F.3d 1208
Makaeff v. Trump University (2013) 715 F.3d 254
Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications (2004) 377 F.3d 1081
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group (2004) 362 F.3d 1367
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