Sweetwater — How to Defeat an anti-SLAPP Motion with Inadmissible Evidence
An anti-SLAPP motion can be viewed as a somewhat one-sided mini-trial, where the plaintiff is required to show sufficient evidence to establish a likelihood of succeeding on their claims. It’s one-sided because the plaintiff’s evidence is “accepted as true,” and the defendant’s evidence is considered only to determine if it establishes an affirmative defense as a matter of law.
But therein lies the rub. The plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to establish a probability of success, while at the same time being prevented from gathering that evidence due to the discovery stay the motion imposes. Perhaps more frustrating, the plaintiff may have the evidence, but the evidence is inadmissible due to issues that could be easily addressed with a little discovery. For example, a plaintiff was provided with a company email from and anonymous source that clearly defames him, but that email is inadmissible hearsay unless and until he conducts discovery to authenticate it. Should such a case be dismissed pursuant to an anti-SLAPP motion even though the supporting evidence exists, but is not yet admissible?
In the decision of Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co., the California Supreme Court came up with a brilliant way to address this conundrum. Sweetwater clarifies that the inquiry is not whether the proffered materials are themselves admissible in their present form, but whether the facts asserted are reasonably capable of being admitted at trial. Read the rest of this entry »
Think Hard Before Filing a Malicious Prosecution Action
I of course take great joy in extricating my client from a lawsuit with an anti-SLAPP motion. The client was stressed over being sued, facing over a year of litigatio, and the possibility of having to pay a judgment. Then I swoop in and in relatively short order and with relatively modest fees, make all the problems go away. I even get their attorney fees paid by the Plaintiff.
But I also feel a little pain for the plaintiffs, especially when they are representing themselves. If an attorney files a SLAPP on behalf of their client, then shame on the attorney. They should know better. But what does Joe Citizen know about anti-SLAPP law? He feels he was done wrong, sues for redress, and ends up unwittingly filing a SLAPP.
The most fertile ground for these self-inflicted wounds are lawsuits for Malicious Prosecution. Bill sues Joe for something, and Joe ends up paying a lot of money to an attorney to fight the lawsuit. But ultimately Joe wins, so he sues Bill for Malicious Prosecution in order to get back his attorney fees. A perfectly legitimate goal. If he hits a home run, he might even get punitive damages. That’ll teach Bill.
But what Joe does not know is that EVERY action for Malicious Prosecution satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, subpart (e), protects:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.
Joe is suing Bill because Bill sued Joe. He is suing for a written statement (the complaint) made in a judicial proceeding. His Malicious Prosecution action therefore automatically satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, namely, that it falls under the anti-SLAPP statute.
But we still have the second prong. Even though the first prong is satisfied, Joe can defeat the anti-SLAPP motion if he can present sufficient evidence to show that his Malicious Prosecution action can succeed. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in Anti-SLAPP motion, Case Results | Tags: Advice of Counsel defense, Interim Adverse Judgment Rule | No Comments »
What is a SLAPPback Action?
I am often asked to pursue SLAPPback actions, and find that the requests usually arise from a misunderstanding of the basis for such an action. I will explain here the basics of a SLAPPback action and why, at least in my practice, the circumstances that would justify a SLAPPback seldom arise.
What is a SLAPPback Action?
SLAPPback actions are created and governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.18. Section 425.18(b)(1) defines SLAPPback:
“SLAPPback” means any cause of action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special motion to strike under Section 425.16.
That simple definition should clear up much of the confusion. A SLAPPback is simply a malicious prosecution action brought by a defendant who successfully brought an anti-SLAPP motion that resulted in a dismissal of the original action. It could also take the form of an abuse of process action, but that will seldom be the case, as I will explain below.
Note also that a SLAPPback is an entirely new lawsuit. The defendant, having successfully extracted himself from legal proceedings by way of a successful anti-SLAPP motion, jumps right back in by filing a malicious prosecution action. I sometimes get requests to bring a “SLAPPback motion,” but as you can see there is no such beast.
Why are SLAPPback actions so rare?
Conceptually, every successful anti-SLAPP motion could be followed by a SLAPPback action. By definition, if an action is dismissed on the basis of an anti-SLAPP motion, then it had no merit. To survive an anti-SLAPP motion the plaintiff need only show that his claim has “minimal merit.” If it could not even meet that standard, then it almost certainly was brought without probable cause; one of the necessary elements of a malicious prosecution action. Read the rest of this entry »
Watch Out for this Fee Motion Timing Trap
Wow. I was in court this morning on a demurrer (which I won, naturellement), but the court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP ruling in the same case hit me vicariously like a 100 mile an hour fast ball to my nether region. As the defense attorney painfully learned, every anti-SLAPP motion is a potential procedural minefield, and the hidden mines only increase in number when an attorney decides to try an untested procedure.
The defamation case in question involves three defendants. I represent Defendants 1 and 2, a husband and wife, and the third defendant (Defendant 3) is represented by another firm.
The complaint is ridiculous, but there was no basis upon which to bring an anti-SLAPP motion as to my clients. There was a strong basis, however, as to Defendant 3. Counsel for Defendant 3 wisely filed an anti-SLAPP motion, and the plaintiffs also quite wisely read the writing on the wall, and dismissed the action as to that Defendant.
So we have a situation that often arises with anti-SLAPP motions. The complaint is dismissed before the motion is decided. But case law is perfectly clear that even though the complaint is dismissed, the defendant is still entitled to attorney fees for the motion IF the court decides the complaint was indeed a SLAPP. Read the rest of this entry »
Context is Everything in Determining if a Statement is Defamatory
A recent holding in the Los Angeles Superior Court beautifully illustrates a point I have made here many times, and have explained to innumerable potential clients. But apparently, some attorneys still don’t embrace this reality.
Here are the facts, as set forth in the Court’s ruling, with additional information from news sources:
Michael Kassan is the former CEO and Chairman of MediaLink. According to its website, MediaLink is “the media & marketing industry’s most trusted and connected advisor, . . . specializing in defining the optimal path forward.”
MediaLink is a United Talent Agency (“UTA”) company, and apparently there was some acrimony between Kassan and UTA. Kassan sued UTA lawyer Bryan J. Freedman in Los Angeles Superior Court for slander and libel stemming from a statement the attorney made to Deadline (a news publication) in which he called Kassan a “pathological liar.” Freedman responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.
Freedman’s statement was found to satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, both because it was “made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a … judicial body,” and because it was a matter of public interest because the dispute between Kassan and UTA was extensively covered in the media.
SLAPP035 – Understanding the Public Interest Requirement
In Episode 35 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we take a deep dive into what constitutes a matter of public interest under the anti-SLAPP statute. It is apparent from the motions we are defeating that counsel is sorely lacking an understanding of this important point. As was held in the Supreme Court case of FilmOn v. DoubleVerify, it’s not enough to simply point to some amorphous matter of public interest. The challenged speech must be “closely related” to that public interest, AND it must somehow “advance the discussion” on the public interest.
We also discuss the craziest appeal Morris & Stone has ever faced. The defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied, but only because of a procedural snafu. The patient Judge denied the motion without prejudice, and invited opposing counsel to refile the motion. No harm, no foul. So why did the attorney instead file an appeal? And is the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion even appealable when it was denied without prejudice?
Listen to Episode 35 for the answers.
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Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the action? [Updated]
Does an anti-SLAPP appeal stay the entire action?
Seemingly, this question has been clearly answered ever since the Supreme Court ruling in Varian Medical Systems v. Delfino, way back in 2005, but I still see a lot of confusion on the topic.
The truth is that an appeal from a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion (granting or denying) does as a general rule stay the action, but there is some nuance. Certain activities can still continue, and the stay may not apply to all claims and parties.
This week, we were surprised that the opposing counsel did not file any opposition to our motion for attorney fees, following our successful anti-SLAPP motion. I was hopeful that the lack of a response was intentional, based on the modest fee request. But I suspected that it had something to do with the appeal he had filed. Upon receiving my Notice of Ruling, granting the requested attorney fees, he called to say that he was shocked that I would go forward with the motion, knowing an appeal was pending. But as I explained to him, an appeal does not stay a motion for attorney fees.
An appeal also does not stay collection of those attorney fees.
In another case, we prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion against an attorney, who was representing herself in a defamation action against my client. After the victory, as is my practice, I asked her if she wanted to pay the current attorney fees in order to avoid the extra expense of the motion for attorney fees.**
She chortled, “You can’t bring a motion for attorney fees, because I filed a notice of appeal regarding the ruling on the motion.”
After I prevailed on my motion for attorney fees, as is my practice, I called counsel to ask if she wanted to pay the (now greater) fees in order to avoid the extra fees for my time spent on collection, and the embarrassment of having her wages garnished at her law firm. (Yes, unlike typical collection efforts, the time spent on collecting attorney fees following an anti-SLAPP motion is recoverable.)
She chortled (what can I say? She’s a chortling fool), “You can’t seek to collect those attorney fees while an appeal is pending.”
Quick sidebar: This is a common misunderstanding, because it is true that the collection of “routine” fees and costs is stayed just by filing an appeal. No appeal bond is required. See Chapala Mgmt. Corp. v. Stanton, 186 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546 (2010). But cases like Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1434 (2001) have held that attorney fees awarded following an anti-SLAPP motion are more akin to sanctions, and collection is not stayed pending appeal. To stop collection, an appeal bond must be posted.
We garnished the attorney’s wages and received 25% of each of her paychecks while we awaited a ruling on the appeal. We defeated her appeal, and this time she took us up on our offer for her to immediately pay the remaining balance plus the additional fees incurred to oppose the appeal, thereby saving herself the cost of another attorney fee motion and continued garnishment.
Allow me to take you through the Varian Medical Systems decision, because it lays out a good summary of the historical background on this point, and explains what is stayed pending appeal. These are the facts as summarized by the Supreme Court. Read the rest of this entry »
Top 6 Worst Arguments Against Attorney Fees
I grow so weary.
Every time I submit a motion for attorney fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion, I am met with at least one of the following arguments, that ten minutes of research would reveal are nonsense. I am convinced that most of the attorneys know what they are saying is wrong, but with no ability to make a viable argument against the fees, they elect to make all the usual crazy arguments in the hope they can slip one or more past the judge.
Here are the top 6 bad arguments attorneys make in opposition to my motions for attorney fees.
1. He didn’t provide his invoices.
I have never attached my invoices to a fee motion. The law is exceedingly clear that an attorney need only attest to the time he spent on the matter. The declaration is under penalty of perjury, and that is sufficient to establish the time. Margolin v. Regional Planning Comm. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1007. Read the rest of this entry »
We Finally Get a Court to Address the “All-or-Nothing” Concept
We just today received an opinion from the Court of Appeal, affirming our victory on an anti-SLAPP motion. Nothing earth shattering there; that is a relatively common occurrence at Morris & Stone.
But what makes this opinion more exciting than most is that the Court adopted a concept we have been advancing for years, without much success. The problem has not been that past courts have necessarily disagreed with our position, it’s just that they do not need to rule on the specific point in order to find in our favor, so the point is not discussed.
A Special Motion to Strike is still a motion to strike; it’s just special.
With a standard motion to strike, the moving party is required to set forth in the notice of motion specifically what they are seeking to strike. If the movant seeks to strike an entire paragraph, that paragraph can be identified by number, but if they want to strike individual words or sentences, those must be quoted verbatim.
This just makes sense, under the concept of due process. If a defendant moves to strike portions of a complaint, the plaintiff can’t properly respond to the motion if those portions are not identified. Quite properly, therefore, a court won’t entertain a motion to strike that simply states, “the court should strike any improper allegations contained in the complaint.”
And yet, as obvious at that concept may appear, that is precisely what occurs in almost every special motion to strike I oppose. The notice of motion will state only that the defendant is seeking to strike the entire complaint, but in response to my opposition, defendant changes tactics and asks that any individual allegations that arise from protected conduct be stricken, without ever identifying those allegations.
The vast majority of the time, the request does not become an issue, because the court simply denies the motion. But in opposing the motion, in addition to my other arguments, I always argue that the court CANNOT decide to split the baby and strike individual allegations, because the defendant did not identify them in the notice of motion. It would be highly unfair, and a violation of due process, for the court to go through the complaint with a scalpel and cut out individual allegations, when I have been given no opportunity to respond. Read the rest of this entry »
SLAPP034 – Are Calls to the Police Still Protected Speech?
In Episode 34 of the California SLAPP Law Podcast, we examine the amendment to Civil Code section 47, which changed calls to the police from being absolutely privileged, to only conditionally privileged. Attorneys who sue for calls to the police, do so at their peril, as opposing counsel learned.
And we are happy to report that Morris & Stone created a new legal precedent, having to do with what we have long referred to as “all-or-nothing” anti-SLAPP motions. In Baral v. Schnitt, the California Supreme Court held that individual allegations of protected speech can be stricken from a complaint. But what if a defendant brings an anti-SLAPP motion that asks only to strike the entire complaint? How should the court handle it, when the defendant then changes course, and asks in the reply brief for individual allegations to be stricken?
Listen to Episode 34 for the answer.
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