Archive for February 2023
Imprecise Pleading Will Run Afoul of the Anti-SLAPP Statute
The SS Imprecise Pleading
The legal profession is like a cargo ship. When a cargo ship decides on a new course, the change is slow and ponderous. When the Supreme Court issues an opinion, the time for that decision to filter down to counsel is equally slow and ponderous.
An attorney who didn’t get the memo.
For example, my last article spoke of the attorney who just this past month based his anti-SLAPP motion on authority holding that any report to the police is absolutely privileged. But that hasn’t been the law for over two years. A report to the police is now only conditionally privileged, and all of the authorities he cited have been superseded.
And so it is with the holding of Baral v. Schnitt, in which the California Supreme Court decided how causes of action with both protected and unprotected speech should be handled. Despite being seven years old, it seems that most attorneys are unaware of the holding.
Which brings us to today’s case study.
Four plaintiffs sued the same defendant, alleging defamation and breach of contract. The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion against all four plaintiffs, and their attorney announced that she would oppose the motion, confident that she would succeed in defeating it.
One of the plaintiffs wanted a second opinion, and came to me. After meeting with me and seeing the veins in my skull expand as all the knowledge passed through, he decided to hire me to oppose the motion. The other three plaintiffs (who hadn’t seen the bulging veins thing) stayed with the original counsel.
So there were two oppositions to the anti-SLAPP motion – mine and the original attorney’s. As to my client, I defeated the motion. As to the other three plaintiffs, the motion was granted. My client is off the hook for any attorney fees.
Lest you think I worked some kind of voodoo magic to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion when the other attorney could not, my client’s situation was slightly different from the rest, and I was able to capitalize on the distinction. The other three were not similarly situated.
But here is what I observed.
Baral v. Schnitt allows the court to go into the complaint with a scalpel and cut out any allegations of privileged speech. It is not enough for a plaintiff’s attorney to simply conclude that there is enough in the action to meet the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. That’s all fine and good to keep the action moving forward, but if defense counsel can point to individual allegations that involve protected speech, and then plaintiff’s counsel can’t satisfy the second prong as to those allegations, the motion will be granted.
Here is an example of how this comes up, based on one of my pending motions, but modified to preserve privacy. Read the rest of this entry »
Is a Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order Subject to an Anti-SLAPP Motion?
Restraining Orders and anti-SLAPP Motions
A very interesting issue arose in an anti-SLAPP matter that was brought to me. It involved a pretty specific situation that I have encountered only once before, but I think a research article is in order, to assist others who might find themselves in the same situation. The case arose from the client’s (Petitioner) obnoxious neighbor (Respondent). Suffice to say that Respondent had over the years engaged in annoying and threatening behavior, and our client had had enough. At the suggestion of the police, she filed an application for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order.
The Judicial Council has created forms to be used for this purpose, and like any form, it is at best a loosely fitting tool for the job. Petitioner filled out the forms the best she could, and attached a declaration to provide some additional facts she thought would be relevant for the court’s analysis.
In her declaration, she told the story of how she had repeatedly called the police in an effort to address Respondent’s harassment. She then said that in response to one of these calls to the police, Respondent had retaliated by making his own police report.
Oops. Reports to the police fall under the anti-SLAPP statute, so that afforded Respondent the opportunity to bring an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike that “allegation.”
Petitioner didn’t know how to deal with the motion, and just showed up on the date set for the restraining order hearing. Thankfully, the court put off that determination so the anti-SLAPP motion could be heard, and set a briefing schedule. Petitioner then hired the Sultan of SLAPP, moi. Read the rest of this entry »
Posted in anti-SLAPP motions, Case Results | Tags: Civil Harassment Restraining Order | 3 Comments »